



RSGC
Royal St. George's College

The Young Researcher

2021 Volume 5 | Issue 1

Generations' Political Party Identification Shifts Over Time

Sage Mehta

Recommended Citation

Mehta, S. (2021). Generations' political party identification shifts over time. *The Young Researcher*, 5 (1), 164-191. <http://www.theyoungresearcher.com/papers/mehta.pdf>

ISSN: 2560-9815 (Print) 2560-9823 (Online) Journal homepage: <http://www.theyoungresearcher.com>

All articles appearing in *The Young Researcher* are licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 Canada License.

Generations' Political Party Identification Shifts Over Time

Sage Mehta

A common belief dictates that as individuals age, they become more conservative, which in America, implicates an increased lean toward the Republican party. In order to determine the accuracy of this conjecture for broad generations, this study sought to determine the degree to which, if at all, generations' political party identifications become more Republican-leaning over time. For this, 65 years of American National Election Studies (ANES) data was used to map out the past progression of each generation's party identification over time. Drawing from tendencies exhibited by the Silent and Baby Boomer Generations, the results indicated that generations become around 0.01 points on the 7-point ANES party identification scale more Republican each year. These findings also provided understanding into the nature of how generations politically shift, suggesting that individuals who are affiliated with one party will increasingly support that party, while those who are originally Independent-leaning tend to shift toward the Republican party over time.

Keywords: politics, political parties, generations, party identification, Republican, Democrat

Introduction

Context

Of the last 10 presidential elections, the two main political parties in the United States, being the Democrats and the Republicans, have each won 5 elections ("Historical U.S. Presidential Elections," 2021). Yet, despite their retaining similar amounts of support amongst the total American population, the division of their affiliates across generations does not translate congruently. Through surveying 2,410 individuals from across all 50 states, Pew Research Center noticed clear trends spanning the generations in both their demographics and political outlook. The

younger generations of Generation X and Millennials saw increased levels of racial diversity, education, and political support for the Democratic party ("The Generation Gap," 2011). On the flip side, the older Silent and Baby Boomer Generations tended to favor small government, be more religiously affiliated, and derived increased support for the Republican party ("The Generation Gap," 2011). This aligns with DeSilver's (2014) findings that "steadfast conservatives" made up only around 4% of 18-29 year-olds but 21% of those 65 and older, with an increasing rate of Republican conservatism across the age groups.

By following these tendencies to their fullest, Generation Z is already beginning to look like a dynamic force as they enter the electorate. Using a survey of

920 “Gen Zers,” aged 13-17, Parker and Igielnik (2020) found that Generation Z is the most racially diverse generation yet, with only 52% being white as opposed to 61% of Millennials, 70% of “Gen Xers,” and 82% of the Baby Boomer Generation. Generation Z is also the more likely than any predecessor to attend college (57% as compared to Millennials’ 52%) and the most likely to have one or more parents with at least a bachelor’s degree (44% as compared to Millennials’ 33%). Socially, Generation Z is the most left-leaning, thinking that the government needs to play a more active role in the country (70% as compared to Millennials’ 64%). Even those who identify as Republican are more likely to support ideas previously considered “socially left,” such that climate change is a man-made issue, racism is a prevalent problem, and society should adopt more inclusive practices toward nonbinary individuals (Parker & Igielnik, 2020). However, there has not yet been time to see how durable Generation Z’s unique background and political views will be going forward, especially when applied to the fragmented modern American parties. In fact, contrary to the current trends of youth Democratism, a common supposition holds that as individuals grow older, they become more Republican. If true, this would mean that the younger generations are simply following a recursive trend, rather than indeed being politically distinct. As for past research on the matter, it has been an ongoing discussion.

Literature Review

In attempts to see how political views change with age, Glenn and Hefner (1972) used 24 years’ worth of Gallup surveys but, rather than finding a clear answer, they discovered a notable issue with the question itself (pp. 31-47). The relative increase in Republicanism amongst populations, they suggested, may have been due to the political climate shifting, rather than the groups’ views. They also questioned whether an overall relationship existed between aging and stronger partisanship, or stability, rather than one which favored a specific political party (Glenn and Hefner, 1972, pp. 31-47). This catalyzed inquiry into the long-standing assumption about aging and Republican-based conservatism and paved the way for the Age-Period-Cohort debate. The concern of this “debate” is

how the variables of age (in reference to one’s progression over time), period (or time period in history), and birth cohort (or generation) are all logically intertwined. Such connections are epitomized by how an age group is equivalent to the present time period minus the group’s birth range; hence, $\text{Age} = \text{Period} - \text{Cohort}$. Because of this overlap, the three variables confound each other when trying to determine correlations as a result of a single one of them. Following up his past work, in 1974, Glenn noted just how indecisive and complicated these relationships become, pointing out that cohort analysis showed that the overall climate of the United States became more socially liberal, so by default older people would seem more conservative in comparison (pp. 176-186). He also questioned whether individuals’ party affiliation measurements would seem stagnant if they got more conservative with age but the period, or political climate at a moment, got more liberal. With too many possibilities, no causation claims could be adopted on the matter, and Glenn (1974) concluded that further research looking into correlation would be strenuous but necessary (pp. 176-186).

Mason et. al. (1973) sought to provide a statistical model that could remedy these Age-Period-Cohort problems and, thereby, approximate the influence of each variable (pp. 242-258). They found that because age, period, and cohort all affect a dependent variable differently, no set linear relationship could encapsulate them all. Nevertheless, Mason et. al. (1973) ran simulations based on known data to yield more accurate comparative models and a nonlinear method, which some in the political research community adopted, while others hesitated (pp. 242-258). To account for other demographic variables, Knoke and Hout (1974) found the effects of seven variables on party identification over time: subjective class, occupation, education, race, religion, region, and father’s party (pp. 700-713). Using two models of different slopes and the Age-Period-Cohort statistical model created by Mason and his colleagues, Knoke and Hout (1974) found that age did have a small but notable effect that correlated to people over the age of 40 becoming more Republican (pp. 700-713). Their analyses also noticed small cohort changes, a sharp contrast to Glenn and Hefner (1972) who favored period effects. Glenn (1976) responded in the *American Sociological Review*, criticizing this work and method-

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

ology concerning the model's inability to separate the Age-Period-Cohort effects because it looked at cross-sectional data (pp. 900-904). He also pointed out that, due to distinct psychological and social changes, each generation must be looked at individually rather than collectively. Hence, in a highly referenced conclusion, Glenn (1976) determined the only way for a study to find age, period, or cohort was to use data spanning over long periods of time (not cross-sectional) that looked at many cohorts/generations (not just one) (pp. 900-904).

In relation to Glenn and Hefner's (1972) previous question of stability, the newest hypothesis in the late 1970s was one called the life-cycle theory, where people would become more partisan over the course of their life. To test this theory, Shively (1979) analyzed the commitment of one to their party over time while controlling for overall period shifts (pp. 437-446). By looking at trends over the course of several major events, he first discovered that political party identification was nearly independent of world occurrences in the period. In addition, Shively's (1979) results on the life-cycle theory yielded the same factor for increased partisanship with aging that had been recorded in Campbell et. al.'s (1960) *The American Voter*, corroborating the idea (pp. 437-446). Alwin and Krosnick (1991) aimed to find the specific degree by which partisan stability strengthened as voters aged, as outlined by these conclusions (pp. 169-195). Using the 7-point party identification scale provided by the American National Election Studies (ANES) to map the intensity of party preference over a few years, their results consistently found that the stability and intensity of one's political beliefs increased with the age (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991, pp. 169-195). These results also fit well with theoretical ideas, such as the impressionable-years hypothesis in which younger voters are predicted to be especially susceptible to changing their political views (Murugesan, 2009, pp. 1-24).

Peterson and his colleagues (2020) intended to again test the aging hypothesis to find out if people, beyond just general partisan strength, shifted more toward one specific political party as they aged. To avoid using cross-sectional data as Knoke and Hout had, Peterson et. al. (2020) used the Michigan Youth-Parent Socialization Panel Study (MSS) for the years 1965-1997 to track specific individuals over time. This was combined with the ANES poll data over the same

4 election cycles to see if either group noted significant party identification changes (pp. 600-611). When comparing the MSS individuals with their forever-young correspondents from the ANES data, the results saw occasional party identification shifts of 0.2 to 0.3 points more Republican per year on the 7-point ANES scale, indicating a fluctuating trend (Peterson et. al., 2020, pp. 600-611). Though they did find more concrete results when looking at the percentage of people that changed their party affiliation, Peterson et. al. (2020) found their study to be inconclusive on the topic of aging, concluding that the minimal years analyzed could not categorize long-term trends nor the degree to which one might exist (pp. 600-611). Additionally, without knowing the shifts or fluctuations of the overall political environment, they found period elements still confounded the findings. Thus, acknowledging the many past discrepancies about the effects of aging on Republicanism, Peterson et. al. (2020) attributed this uncertainty to a lack of a long-term study, where many cohorts could be tracked over the course of their lifetimes (pp. 600-611).

Applying this highly disputed field of research to the British electorate, Tilley and Evans (2014) looked at data from the British Election Studies (BES) for 13 elections to show that older populations were more conservative (pp. 19-27). They then took this trend and looked at the effects of aging in comparison to panel and aggregate changes and plotted the resultant points. Tilley and Evans' (2014) concluded that British voters' ideology shifted toward their conservative party over time by a factor between an average minimum of 0.32% and an average maximum of 0.38% per year (pp. 19-27). While further outlining the possibility of a conservative trend, these findings could not be applied to the Republican party due to the different embodiments of conservatism and historical developments in each of the country's political parties. In company with the distinct nature of the American electorate, factors including varying government forms, political engagement, and partisanship all additionally contribute to the potential for different trends to exist within the United States.

Entry Point and Research Question

Though these past studies foretell much about the nature of shifting political alignment, many chasms in

the body of knowledge remain. Despite knowing from Shively (1979) and Alwin and Krosnick (1991) that people become more dedicated to their political party over time, no one has found a definitive answer to the specific lean or one-sided party shifts in America. This is, in large part, due to the limited timespans and methodology used in past studies, which has made for Age-Period-Cohort contradictions when trying to determine whether people truly become more Republican as they age. In fact, the analysis of a long-term continual dataset that can monitor the views of many cohorts over the course of their lifetimes is precisely the gap mentioned by Glenn (1976) and Peterson et. al. (2020) needed to settle the longstanding Age-Period-Cohort debate. In accordance, it became the basis of what I set out to do. Finally, Tilly and Evans (2014) came the closest to ameliorating this manner; however, as they acknowledged themselves, their findings are not generalizable beyond Britain and so cannot be applied to the American political system.

Thus, in order to build upon these past controversies and inconclusiveness, I proposed the following research question: **To what degree do generations' political party identifications become more Republican-leaning over time in America?** Throughout my research, I first aimed to determine the past party identification progression of each generation over time and the degree by which any shifts were occurring. I then intended to identify any Age-Period-Cohort implications, having accounted for their discrepancies. My final main goal was to determine what the generational party identification trends suggested about how the American electorate's political outlook shifts over time. The significance of this topic lies with the way that its results not only provide a divisive answer to the recurrent speculation of a Republican-shifting aging trend, but also shine broader light on how future generations may politically behave in America. Before beginning to collect data on the matter, I hypothesized that generations become more Republican in their political leanings over time.

For the purposes of this paper, the "generations" referenced will refer to the Greatest Generation (born 1901-1924), the Silent Generation (born 1925-1945), the Baby Boomer Generation (born 1946-1964), Generation X (born 1965-1980), Generation Y/Millennials (born 1981-1996), and Generation Z (born 1997-

2012), considering that these are the most popularly accepted generations. Additionally, "party identification" will be measured on the previously referenced ANES 7-point scale, which goes 1: Strong Democrat, 2: Weak Democrat, 3: Independent-Democrat, 4: Independent-Independent, 5: Independent-Republican, 6: Weak Republican, 7: Strong Republican.

Methods

Study Design

In order for me to best track generational political party identification shifts over time, I conducted an analytical study using existing data that extended back many decades. This was the most reliable method for me because it provided broad access to a population set most similar to my frame of reference, that being voting-age Americans from across the United States. Moreover, it allowed me to track each generation's party identification over time, rather than at a single moment, to notice any key changes. All the while, this design let me circumvent previous pitfalls of past research in the same field since I would be using a long stretch of data over many periods for multiple cohorts or, in this case, generations. Such a solid basis of how generations' party identification progressed over time best set me up to identify trends in political affiliation as they aged.

Ethical Considerations

My research was approved by the Institutional Review Board and not noted to have any ethical concerns. This is consistent with my use of exclusively existing, public data, none of which contained any identifiable information.

Selection of Data and Variables

I used American National Election Studies (ANES) data to create the yearly charts that became the basis for my calculations and research due to the fact that ANES had the most comprehensive data about the American electorate for the longest period of time. The data was formed by surveys and interviews that were conducted both face-to-face and online, com-

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

pleted before and after voting. The combined data totaled 59,944 participants from all 50 states and D.C. over a range of 69 years (DeBell et. al., 2018). When narrowing down what specific data I wanted to use from the ANES surveys to become my variables on the yearly charts, I first chose party identification. This was due to Campbell and associates' (1960) conclusion that party identification is the core to political views because it is more robust to short-term factors—such as political candidates, period events, and environmental influences—than one's ballot per year. To measure party identification, I specifically used the ANES' 7-point scale as it is most consistent with past research and to account for Neundorf et. al.'s (2011) conclusion of "bounded partisanship," in which making the switch to an independent party identification takes less instability than switching between major parties (pp. 458-482). This notion indicates that the figurative distance between partisan and independent ideologies is less than between the two parties, which the 7-point scale reflects at multiple intervals. Alongside the 7-point party identification scale, I used age as my second variable because it allowed me to map out each generation's progression over time and "generation" itself was not an ANES variable option. The maximum age range of the ANES data extended from 17-99, although to make my analysis representative of voting-age Americans (18+) only, I excluded the data of the 17 years old from my calculations. Additionally, to avoid results that were not reliably representative of a certain age that may have skewed my data, I only used the ages that had a sample size (n) of at least 10 participants, which sometimes led me to exclude the youngest and oldest few ages in a chart's given range (these exclusions are noted in the annotated tables of Appendix B).

Procedure

In order to close the gap on past debates of whether or not, and to what degree, generations become more Republican as they age, I first aimed to determine the progression of each generation's party identification over time. To begin my research, I created a table with the 6 generations I am considering in my research as columns against rows of each year of available ANES data, being 1952, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1964, 1966,

1968, 1970, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016. Then, using the birth-year ranges of each generation, as defined earlier, I calculated the age ranges that each generation would be for each year listed (see Appendix A). I did this step so that it would be easier for me to identify which ages corresponded to which generation whilst I was collecting the data from the yearly sources. Next, I accessed the archive of the Survey Documentation and Analysis (SDA) database online and went to the section headed "American National Election Studies (ANES)." From here I used the ANES Cumulative Datafile 1948-2016 (SDA 4) to generate data tables of "PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent - 7-point Scale" (variable VCF0301) versus "DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age" (variable VCF0101) by using the row and column options respectively. I did this first for the year 1952, being the first year to include both variables, by additionally putting "year(1952)" into the selection filter before running the table. I repeated this process for all subsequent available years and took screenshot pictures of each chart along the way. Using a digital writing tool, I then annotated the age cut-offs of each generation for a given year according to the ranges determined in the Appendix A table. Next, I found the party identification of each age in a year, starting again with 1952, by adding the products of the frequencies of each party identification level and their corresponding numbers as ranked 1-7. To find the party identification of each generation in that year, I then took the average of these age groups (excluding ages with a sample of less than 10) between the lines annotated earlier on each chart (see all work in Appendix B). I recorded my results of average party identification for each generation in another table and proceeded to do this for every generation in each yearly chart. To simplify this process further, beginning in the year 1958, I adopted a slightly alternative method where I added all the ages' frequencies in a generation for each party identification level, multiplied them by the corresponding number ranked 1-7, took the summation of all of these, and then again divided by the total number of ages accounted for in that generation. This way I could calculate the generational averages by working with the 7 party identification levels rather than all of the ages individually, which became a more time-efficient manner.

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

Findings

After performing this process for each yearly chart, the data for the party identification progression of each generation was complete (see final data in Appendix C). To visualize these trends better and because the data represented a progression over time, I transcribed the data into scatterplots for each generation's party identification versus the years used. I additionally made a plot of the total average party identification over time in order to see the progression of all of the included generations over the years. Moreover,

I conducted linear regression t-tests ($\alpha=0.05$), as they align best with scatterplots, and linear regression intervals with 95% confidence levels to get the ranges for each generation's expected yearly shifts (see each generation's full statistics in Appendix D). For the linear-regression t-test, the null hypothesis was $\beta_1=0$, indicating no relationship between party identification and time. The alternative hypothesis stated that $\beta_1 \neq 0$, suggesting a relationship in how that generation's party identification changed over time.

For the Greatest Generation (Fig. 1) the test failed to find a relationship between party identification and

Figure 1: The Greatest Generation




Figure 2: The Silent Generation




Figure 3: The Baby Boomer Generation




Figure 4: Generation X




Figure 5: Generation Y/Millennials





Figure 6: Total Average Party Identification Per Year



time, with a large p-value=0.491. In contrast, the Silent Generation (Fig. 2) yielded a statistically significant rejection of the null hypothesis, with a small p-value=0.000001, thus suggesting a relationship. Over the 65 years and 28 elections, a 95% confidence interval found this average shift of the Silent Generation to be between 0.007 and 0.013 points (on the 7-point ANES scale) more Republican each year. Very similar to the Silent Generation, the Baby Boomer Generation's party identification versus time data (Fig. 3) determined a strong correlation ($r=0.729$) between party identification and time (p-value=0.0002). This suggested an association, by which the 95% confidence interval placed between 0.006 and 0.017 points more Republican per year. Generation X (Fig. 4) saw no statistically significant evidence to suggest that their party identification consistently shifted over time (p-value=0.478). Likewise, over the minimal time span of only 6 elections, Generation Y/Millennials' data (Fig. 5) failed to reject the independence of variables party identification and time with a large p-value=0.285. The total average party identification of all the used generations each year (Fig. 6), starting in 1952 and reaching until 2016, generated a strong correlation ($r=0.759$). The presence of a relationship rejected the null hypothesis (p-value=0.000003), and a 95% confidence interval measured this relationship to be between 0.006 and 0.011 party identification points more Republican each year.


Analysis and Discussion

Generational Conclusion

The results from this wide-ranging analytical study offered considerable insight into the question of whether or not, and to what degree, generations' political party identifications become more Republican-leaning over time in America. The most notable findings came from the only two comprehensive generations, those being the Silent Generation and the Baby Boomer Generation. Both generations produced similar confidence intervals that placed the slope of the identification versus time graphs between around +0.007 and +0.013, indicating that over the course of a hundred years a generation will become around one step more Republican-leaning on the 7-point party identification scale. This confirmed my hypothesis in favor of the popular conjecture by showing the presence of a small shift over time.

While the other generations failed to recreate this same trend with any significance, it remains noteworthy the limitations of their scopes. The Greatest Generation began with an older population (not starting with 18 year-olds as the aforementioned two generations did) and ended with often fewer ages of much smaller sample sizes as even the youngest ages of the generation pushed increasingly into their 80s and 90s. This latter phenomenon proves evident in Figure 1 where the starkest inconsistencies in any of the data

Figure 7: All Generations' Party Identification Over Time



GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME


occurred toward the end of the Greatest Generation, as shown by the large and fluctuating residuals of the scatterplot. For Generation X and Generation Y/Millennials, the sheer lack of data points due to the narrower lifespans of the generations disrupted the ability to identify any definitive long-term progressions. With this in mind, the Silent and Baby Boomer Generations were the only two comprehensive generations and hence the most critical ones for identifying trends. Thus, their significant findings still suggest a vaguely generalizable trend of generations becoming more Republican as the age, despite not being explicitly reiterated by the other generations.

Age-Period-Cohort Conclusion

Alongside this generational conclusion, the research shines supplemental light on the ways to control for and operation of the Age-Period-Cohort debate. In regard to controlling for cohort effects, by following multiple set cohorts, being the generations, I analyzed the specific effects of aging on the distinguishable generations. Interestingly, since the only significant trends were remarkably similar despite being by distinct generations (the Silent and Baby Boomer ones), it suggests that the cohorts themselves do not behave differently when it comes to party identification progression. Though only two generations, this casts doubt on the cohort hypothesis, at the very least forcing it to shift to encompass much larger birth ranges (the Silent and Baby Boomer Generations jointly span 40 years).

Furthermore, the data's vast reach across many time periods, embodied by the "Total Average Party Identification Per Year" plot (Fig. 6), accounted for period changes. The scatterplot's fairly linear and consistent trend signals that party identification is not subject in a major way to outside events. Not only does this reinforce Campbell et. al.'s (1960) idea that party identification would be reasonably robust, but it also bolsters Shively's (1979) conclusion against the period hypothesis due to world events more principally. In regard to a more general period concept in which the entire population naturally shifted over time in accompaniment with societal changes, the increasing divergence of the generations as they became more numerous, which can be seen more clearly below in Figure 7, steers against this idea. This shows that the generations are not all following one set pattern which would be the case if it was merely the period that had changed. Further still, considering each generation consistently responded to the same American National Election Studies 7-point scale, if it was the period that made younger ages seem more Democratic and thereby led to the total average plot's progression (Fig. 6), the individual generation's graphs would still look stagnant. Therefore, considering the Silent and Baby Boomer Generations' individual scatterplots depicted statistically significant trends with their positive slopes, it can be affirmed that it is the generations themselves shifting, not the period. This outcome additionally underscores historical trends as the previously mentioned increasing youth Democratism from "The Generation Gap" (2011) denotes that, if anything, the total average chart should favor a Democratic, as opposed to Republican, shift.

All of this comes together in support of the idea that, rather than those of cohorts or periods, the shift in party identification in America is due to "aging" or, in the sense of generations, the groups progressing through time. To a large extent, this puts an end to the highly discussed Age-Period-Cohort debate first described by Glenn and Hefner (1972) and aligns with Tilley and Evans' (2014) analysis of the debate done in Britain. My results specifically unite generations' "aging" in correlation to their party identification becoming more Republican. It is still acknowledged, however, that the actual reasoning for why this phenomenon occurs remains unknown and the innate process of aging might not be the true cause. Such a



caveat is referenced by Glenn (1974) when discussing the difficulty of even defining the manifestations of an “aging” process: psychological development rates, life-cycle and maturity stages, different environmental pressures, biological progressions, the neurological passage of time, a combination, or something else altogether (pp. 176-186).

Nature of the American Electorate's Political Shifts Conclusion

Another intriguing point of these results when combined with Alwin and Krosnick's (1991) findings is its commentary on the nature of how generations shift politically. Their idea that individuals become more extreme in a party lean over the course of their lifetimes is a trend that even the ANES yearly tables allude to with their consistent narrowing of the Independent groups as the ages got older. Illustrated in the lower-left corner charts, an example of this can be seen in Figure 8, which is the 1952 table cropped and edited to highlight this phenomenon. When taken in parallel with the idea that generations as a whole become slightly more Republican over time, then it is likely not that each person shifts slightly Republican over their lifetime, but rather that already Republican and Democrat-leaning individuals become stronger party affiliates, while the originally Independent and less decided populations shift more Republican in greater aggregate amounts.

The final conclusion that can be drawn from this research ties back to the inquiry brought up at the beginning of this paper. It wondered if the younger generations of today would grow up to be any fundamentally different than our parents in reference to political outlook and what this may hold for the future of the American political climate. To the former measure, the answer has the potential to go either way. Although there is reason to believe that generations' party identification becomes more Republican as they age, the factor by which this occurrence exists was situated at only around one step over a generation's duration of nearly a century. This means that if the younger generations do indeed follow the vision outlined for them so far within recent polls as a novel Democratic force, then it will not take much to inundate the Republican-shifting aging trend. This leads to a future political climate of competing forces: on

one side a group of present-day Independents shifting rightwards, while an increasingly diverse, educated, and socially liberal youth body extends left. As for the breadth by which this latter power might prevail, and thereby the end result, it seems as though only time will tell.

Future Directions

A feasible future extension of this study would be to look at how the party identification of each individual age progressed over time, hence eliminating the need to draw semi-arbitrary lines grouping people into “generations.” Although this would likely be valuable in order to corroborate the aging conclusion outside of just generations, it would not propagate insight into the actions of mass sectors of society going forward. As to achieve this latter goal, another relevant direction would be to investigate how the younger generations may be psychologically distinct and the reasons behind any variation. This deeper understanding of the fundamental nature of the generations could yield heightened conclusions on how their perspectives translate into political views. When taken alongside other demographic nuances of the younger generations that may impact overall political outlook—including racial make-up, urban and rural distributions, religious beliefs, education level, wealth and class discrepancies, and total electoral size—such generational trends may be applied toward the forthcoming years. All of this in parallel with the party identification shifts of generations over time, as determined by this paper, would facilitate the ability to make better predictive models about the next generations' political leanings and, in accordance, garner a more holistic picture for the future of American politics.

References

- Alwin, D., & Krosnick, J. (1991). Aging, Cohorts, and the Stability of Sociopolitical Orientations Over the Life Span. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(1), 169-195. doi:10.1086/229744
- Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. (1960). *The American Voter*. New York: J. Wiley & Sons.
- DeBell, M., Amsbary, M., Meldener, V., Brock, S., & Maisel, N. (2018, February 20). Methodology Report for the ANES 2016 Time Series Study. *American National Election Studies*. The University of Michigan and Stanford University. Retrieved from https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/anes_timeseries_2016_methodology_report.pdf.
- DeSilver, D. (2014, July 9). The politics of American generations: How age affects attitudes and voting behavior. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/09/the-politics-of-american-generations-how-age-affects-attitudes-and-voting-behavior/>.
- The Generation Gap and the 2012 Election (2011, November 3). Section 1: How Generations Have Changed. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from <https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2011/11/03/section-1-how-generations-have-changed/>.
- Glenn, N.D., & Hefner, T. (1972). Further Evidence on Aging and Party Identification. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36(1), 31-47. doi: 10.1086/267973
- Glenn N.D. (1974). Aging and Conservatism. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 415(1):176-186. doi:10.1177/000271627441500113
- Glenn, N.D. (1976). Cohort Analysts' Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort Effects. *American Sociological Review*, 41(5), 900-904. doi:10.2307/2094738
- Historical U.S. Presidential Elections 1789-2020. (2021). *270 to Win*. 2021 Electoral Ventures LLC. Retrieved from <https://www.270towin.com/historical-presidential-elections/>.
- Knock, D., & Hout, M. (1974). Social and Demographic Factors in American Political Party Affiliations, 1952-72. *American Sociological Review*, 39(5), 700-713. doi:10.2307/2094315
- Mason, K., Mason, W., Winsborough, H., & Poole, W. (1973). Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data. *American Sociological Review*, 38(2), 242-258. doi: 10.2307/2094398
- Murugesan, V. (2009). Impressionable years: The long-term effect of political environment on young adults. In *Impressionable years: The long-term effect of political environment on young adults* (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, pp. 1-24). University of California, Los Angeles.
- Neundorff, A., Stegmueller, D., & Scotto, T. J. (2011). The Individual-Level Dynamics of Bounded Partisanship. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 75(3), 458-482. doi:10.1093/poq/nfr018
- Parker, K., & Igielnik, R. (2020, May 14). What We Know About Gen Z So Far. *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/essay/on-the-cusp-of-adulthood-and-facing-an-uncertain-future-what-we-know-about-gen-z-so-far/>.
- Peterson, J. C., Smith, K. B., & Hibbing, J. R. (2020). Do People Really Become More Conservative as They Age? *The Journal of Politics*, 82(2), 600-611. doi:10.1086/706889
- Shively, W. (1979). The Relationship Between Age and Party Identification: A Cohort Analysis. *Political Methodology*, 6(4), 437-446. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791092>.
- Tilley, J., & Evans, G. (2014). Ageing and generational effects on vote choice: Combining cross-sectional and panel data to estimate APC effects. *Electoral Studies*, 33, 19-27. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.007

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
44-67	46-69	48-71	50-73	52-75	54-77	56-79	
23-43	25-45	27-47	29-49	31-51	33-53	35-55	
18-22	18-24	18-26	18-28	18-30	18-32	18-34	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
18-67	18-69	18-71	18-73	18-75	18-77	18-79	


	1998	2000	2002	2004	2008	2012	2016
74--	76--	78--	80--	84--	88--	92--	
53-73	55-75	57-77	59-79	63-83	67-87	71-91	
34-52	36-54	38-56	40-58	44-62	48-66	52-70	
18-33	20-35	22-37	24-39	28-43	32-47	36-51	
-	18-19	18-21	18-23	18-27	18-31	20-35	
-	-	-	-	-	-	18-19	

SDA 4.1.2: Tables

American National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
Nov 20, 2020 (Fri 10:16 AM PST)


Role	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Row	VCF0301	PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent - 7-point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF0101	DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF0009Z	STUDY VARIABLE: Weight: For 1970 type 0 - 2012,2016 full sample	.0212-6.8130		1
Filter	YEAR(1956)		1,948-2,016		2

year (1956)



3.4869

3.5985



Allocation of cases (unweighted)	
Valid cases	1,870
Cases excluded by filter or weight	58,182
Cases with invalid codes on row or column variable	92
Total cases	59,944

Datasets	
1	/html/D3/NES2016C
2	/html/Npubvars/NES2016C

CSM, UC Berkeley

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

SDA 4.1.2: Tables

American National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
Jan 07, 2021 (Thu 03:19 PM PST)

Role	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Row	VCF0301	PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent-7-point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF0101	DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF0092Z	STUDY VARIABLE: Weight For 1970 type 0 - 2012.2016 full sample	0212-8130	1	
Filter	YEAR(1966)		1,948-2,916	2	

year (1966)


Cells contain:	Column percent	Weighted N	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67
1. Strong Democrat	0	0	18.7	12.6	12.1	0	18.6	14.3	0	13.0	8.9	8.3	8.0	0	26.7	28.0	25.0	23.3	20.0	20.6	11.6	30.1	14.3	11.8	4.2	22.9	12.5	25.0	8.6	21.4	28.6	24.0	29.6	10.7	20.8	12.5	25.0	26.1	19.2	25.0	46.0	19.0	14.3	20.0	18.8	22.2	33.3	25.0	17.6		
2. Weak Democrat	0	0	28.6	16.7	38.4	23.1	29.6	33.3	60.0	34.8	37.9	33.3	20.0	38.9	26.7	36.7	15.0	23.3	32.0	35.3	38.5	23.1	17.8	23.6	37.6	14.3	30.0	25.0	33.3	28.6	19.0	36.0	44.4	39.3	29.2	18.8	31.2	21.7	34.8	36.0	25.0	19.0	21.4	20.0	25.0	22.2	13.3	10.0	17.6		
3. Independent - Democrat	100	0	10.7	25.8	3.0	11.5	7.4	9.6	25.8	4.3	13.8	8.3	20.0	16.7	6.7	7.1	10.0	26.7	8.0	2.0	19.2	7.7	10.7	6.8	16.7	20.0	12.5	16.7	0	7.1	0	6.8	3.7	3.6	12.5	6.2	6.2	4.3	11.5	10.0	0	9.5	0	20.0	6.2	0	10.0	5.9			
4. Independent - Republican	0	0	25.0	12.5	12.1	23.1	14.8	9.5	12.5	21.7	17.2	25.0	18.0	11.1	0	3.6	10.0	6.7	4.0	14.7	11.5	7.7	7.1	11.8	16.7	8.6	12.5	4.2	14.3	25.0	23.8	8.0	14.8	3.6	4.2	6.2	12.5	13.0	3.8	10.0	15.0	23.8	7.1	20.0	6.2	22.2	13.3	20.0	17.6		
5. Independent - Republican	0	0	7.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	2.0	5.8	5.0	5.0	4.0	2.0	0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	5.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	1.0	1.0	3.0	5.0	1.0			
6. Weak Republican	0	0	16.7	16.7	9.1	15.4	14.8	23.8	0	13.0	8.9	20.8	8.0	27.8	26.7	10.7	10.0	3.3	20.0	14.7	11.5	23.1	21.4	23.6	20.8	14.3	22.5	12.5	18.0	10.7	14.3	16.0	0	21.4	16.7	37.5	12.5	17.4	11.5	10.0	15.0	9.5	36.7	20.0	0	20.0	23.5	4.8			
7. Strong Republican	0	0	12.5	12.1	11.5	0	4.8	6.2	8.7	13.8	0	20.0	6.5	6.7	7.1	15.0	3.3	4.0	0	0	7.7	10.7	11.8	0	11.4	6.8	12.5	8.6	7.1	14.3	8.8	3.7	17.8	16.7	18.8	12.6	8.7	7.7	8.0	9.5	7.1	0	18.8	33.3	13.3	15.0	11.8				
COL TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100			

The Silent Gen.

The Greatest Gen.

Color coding: <20 <1 <2 <3 <4 <5 <6 <7 <8 <9 <10 <11 <12 <13 <14 <15 <16 <17 <18 <19 <20 <21 <22 <23 <24 <25 <26 <27 <28 <29 <30 <31 <32 <33 <34 <35 <36 <37 <38 <39 <40 <41 <42 <43 <44 <45 <46 <47 <48 <49 <50 <51 <52 <53 <54 <55 <56 <57 <58 <59 <60 <61 <62 <63 <64 <65 <66 <67 <68 <69

N in each cell: Smaller than expected Larger than expected



1 (3.005)
2 (6.351)
3 (2.500)
4 (2.628)
5 (1.909)
6 (3.076)
7 (1.447)
+
72.159
÷ 21 ages
3.4361

1 (5.014)
2 (6.573)
3 (1.835)
4 (3.006)
5 (1.331)
6 (3.808)
7 (2.526)
+
82.874
÷ 24 ages
3.4531

Allocation of cases (unweighted)

Valid cases: 1,252
Cases excluded by filter or weight: 58,653
Cases with invalid codes on row or column variable: 38
Total cases: 59,944

Datasets:
1. hmiD3NES2016C
2. hmiHspvares2016C

CSM: UC Berkeley

SDA 4.1.2: Tables

American National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
Jan 08, 2021 (Fri 10:54 AM PST)

Role	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Row	VCF0301	PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent-7-point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF0101	DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF0092Z	STUDY VARIABLE: Weight For 1970 type 0 - 2012.2016 full sample	0212-8130	1	
Filter	YEAR(1968)		1,948-2,916	2	

year (1968)


Cells contain:	Column percent	Weighted N	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69
1. Strong Democrat	9.4	11.5	8.9	0	10.3	12.5	8.3	7.4	15.6	30.0	12.9	9.5	16.7	20.0	25.0	19.0	23.1	22.9	32.4	38.8	18.5	31.2	21.9	5.8	8.8	18.2	18.4	14.7	17.2	9.1	15.8	28.0	36.0	17.1	18.0	28.6	33.3	36.0	23.5	16.7	25.0	30.0	34.6	16.0	19.0	60.0	22.2	31.6	23		
2. Weak Democrat	21.9	23.1	37.9	25.8	15.4	22.9	20.8	18.5	18.8	30.0	36.0	33.3	20.8	28.6	37.0	33.3	41.0	25.7	17.6	21.1	22.2	21.9	15.6	23.5	32.4	27.3	38.8	38.2	17.2	39.4	31.6	15.6	8.0	28.6	38.0	14.3	25.9	16.0	5.9	25.0	12.5	25.0	28.9	23.8	21.4	33.3	15.8	29			
3. Independent - Democrat	21.9	15.4	20.7	33.3	23.1	12.5	8.3	22.2	15.6	3.3	4.0	9.5	12.5	17.1	7.4	14.3	17.9	11.4	5.9	7.9	3.7	6.2	3.1	20.8	8.8	18.2	2.6	11.8	13.8	9.1	5.3	12.5	12.0	2.9	8.0	9.5	7.4	4.0	5.9	8.3	12.5	5.0	3.8	4.0	4.8	0	21.1	5			
4. Independent - Republican	15.6	26.9	17.2	9.5	17.9	20.8	16.7	11.1	15.6	6.7	8.0	4.8	16.7	0	11.1	4.0	2.6	11.4	11.8	2.6	18.5	9.4	21.9	14.7	5.0	8.8	12.1	10.5	8.8	13.8	6.1	21.1	12.5	4.0	8.6	8.0	4.8	7.4	12.0	17.6	8.3	18.8	10.0	11.5	4.0	19.0	3.6	11.1	5.3		
5. Independent - Republican	5.0	7.0	5.0	2.0	7.0	10.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	2.0	1.0	4.0	0	0	3.0	1.0	1.0	4.0	4.0	1.0	4.0	1.0	5.0	3.0	7.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	4.0	1.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0				
6. Weak Republican	4.2	3.8	6.8	0	15.4	30.0	16.7	11.1	15.6	26.7	24.0	19.0	20.8	14.3	3.7	4.8	5.1	11.4	14.7	15.8	14.8	21.0	12.5	14.7	3.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0		
7. Strong Republican	9.4	0	8.9	4.8	0	0	16.7	7.4	12.5	0	8.0	14.3	4.2	8.6	3.7	9.5	5.1	5.7	2.9	7.9	3.7	3.1	9.4	14.7	5.9	3.0	13.2	2.9	10.3	12.1	5.3	6.2	12.0	14.3	4.0	9.5	14.8	8.0	17.6	12.5	12.5	5.0	7.7	36.0	4.8	17.6	16.7	10.5	11		
COL TOTAL	32.0	26.0	29.0	21.0	39.0	48.0	24.0	27.0	32.0	32.0	25.0	21.0	24.0	35.0	27.0	21.0	39.0	35.0	34.0	38.0	27.0	32.0	32.0	34.0	34.0	33.0	38.0	34.0	29.0	32.0	32.0	25.0	35.0	25.0	21.0	27.0	25.0	17.0	24.0	20.0	26.0	25.0	21.0	28.0	18.0	19.0					

Baby Boomer Gen. The Silent Gen.

The Greatest Gen.

Color coding: <20 <1 <2 <3 <4 <5 <6 <7 <8 <9 <10 <11 <12 <13 <14 <15 <16 <17 <18 <19 <20 <21 <22 <23 <24 <25 <26 <27 <28 <29 <30 <31 <32 <33 <34 <35 <36 <37 <38 <39 <40 <41 <42 <43 <44 <45 <46 <47 <48 <49 <50 <51 <52 <53 <54 <55 <56 <57 <58 <59 <60 <61 <62 <63 <64 <65 <66 <67 <68 <69

N in each cell: Smaller than expected Larger than expected



1 (3.809)
2 (5.470)
3 (2.599)
4 (2.391)
5 (2.417)
6 (2.960)
7 (1.344)
+
71.363
÷ 21 ages
3.3982

1 (5.391)
2 (5.926)
3 (1.908)
4 (2.571)
5 (1.704)
6 (3.848)
7 (2.669)
+
83.522
÷ 24 ages
3.4801

Allocation of cases (unweighted)

Valid cases: 1,252
Cases excluded by filter or weight: 58,653
Cases with invalid codes on row or column variable: 38
Total cases: 59,944

Datasets:
1. hmiD3NES2016C
2. hmiHspvares2016C

CSM: UC Berkeley

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME




GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

SDA 4.1.2: Tables

American National Election Study (1948-2016) - Cumulative
Jan 11, 2021 (Mon 10:59 AM PST)

Role	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Row	VCF001	PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent: 7-point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF001	DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF000Z	STUDY VARIABLE: Weight: For 1978 type 0 - 2012,2016 full sample	0212.8-0130	1	
Filter	YEAR1978		1948-2016	2	

year(1978)




SDA 4.1.2: Tables

American National Election Study (1948-2016) - Cumulative
Jan 11, 2021 (Mon 11:30 AM PST)

Role	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Row	VCF001	PARTISANSHIP: Party Identification of Respondent: 7-point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF001	DEMOGRAPHICS: Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF000Z	STUDY VARIABLE: Weight: For 1978 type 0 - 2012,2016 full sample	0212.8-0130	1	
Filter	YEAR1980		1948-2016	2	

year(1980)




GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

SDA 4.1.2 Tables
American National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
Jan 14, 2021 (Thu 10:50 AM PST)

Rate	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Flow	VCF981	PARTISANSHIP Party Identification of Respondent - 7 point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF981	DEMOGRAPHICS Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF980R2	STUDY VARIABLE Weight For 1978 type 8 - 2012-2016 full sample	0.015-6.010	1	1
Filter	YEAR1988	1948-2.016		2	


year(1988)





year(1990)

SDA 4.1.2 Tables
American National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
Jan 16, 2021 (Fri 10:50 AM PST)



Rate	Name	Label	Range	MD	Dataset
Flow	VCF991	PARTISANSHIP Party Identification of Respondent - 7 point Scale	1-7	0	1
Column	VCF991	DEMOGRAPHICS Respondent - Age	17-99	0	1
Weight	VCF990R2	STUDY VARIABLE Weight For 1978 type 9 - 2012-2016 full sample	0.015-6.010	1	1
Filter	YEAR1990	1948-2.016		2	



GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME



GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME




GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

DA 4.1.2: Tables

iran National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
 as of 2021 (year 60) (NAEPST)

Variable	Label	Range	Min	Max
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016
Age	AGE	18-90	18	90
Gender	GENDER	1-2	1	2
Education	EDUCATION	1-5	1	5
Income	INCOME	1-5	1	5
Urban/Rural	URBAN_RURAL	1-2	1	2
Region	REGION	1-31	1	31
Country	COUNTRY	1	1	1
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016

year(2002)



5835
 ÷ 2 ages
 2917.5

66.743
 ÷ 16 ages
 4.1714

73.311
 ÷ 19 ages
 3.8585

60.474
 ÷ 16 ages
 3.7796

0 ages = n/a

Education of each respondent

Education	Count
1	1450
2	1450
3	1450
4	1450
5	1450

Details


- Missing: 0
- Minimum: 1
- Maximum: 5
- Mean: 2.9175
- Standard Deviation: 1.450

DA 4.1.2: Tables

iran National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
 as of 2021 (year 60) (NAEPST)

Variable	Label	Range	Min	Max
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016
Age	AGE	18-90	18	90
Gender	GENDER	1-2	1	2
Education	EDUCATION	1-5	1	5
Income	INCOME	1-5	1	5
Urban/Rural	URBAN_RURAL	1-2	1	2
Region	REGION	1-31	1	31
Country	COUNTRY	1	1	1
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016

year(2004)



21.924
 ÷ 6 ages
 3.6540

61.039
 ÷ 16 ages
 3.8149

77.282
 ÷ 19 ages
 4.0675

52.464
 ÷ 14 ages
 3.7474

3.405
 ÷ 1 age
 3.4050

Education of each respondent

Education	Count
1	1450
2	1450
3	1450
4	1450
5	1450

Details


- Missing: 0
- Minimum: 1
- Maximum: 5
- Mean: 2.9175
- Standard Deviation: 1.450

4.1.2: Tables

iran National Election Study 1948-2016 - Cumulative
 as of 2021 (year 60) (NAEPST)

Variable	Label	Range	Min	Max
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016
Age	AGE	18-90	18	90
Gender	GENDER	1-2	1	2
Education	EDUCATION	1-5	1	5
Income	INCOME	1-5	1	5
Urban/Rural	URBAN_RURAL	1-2	1	2
Region	REGION	1-31	1	31
Country	COUNTRY	1	1	1
Year	YEAR	1948-2016	1948	2016

year(2008)



36.151
 ÷ 10 ages
 3.6151

58.776
 ÷ 16 ages
 3.6735

71.405
 ÷ 19 ages
 3.7582

73.375
 ÷ 19 ages
 3.8618

3.683
 ÷ 1 age
 3.6830

Education of each respondent

Education	Count
1	1450
2	1450
3	1450
4	1450
5	1450

Details

- Missing: 0
- Minimum: 1
- Maximum: 5
- Mean: 2.9175
- Standard Deviation: 1.450

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980
3.4801	3.4624	3.5732	3.6475	3.5229	3.36	3.3115
3.3982	3.5196	3.642	3.5572	3.695	3.535	3.6481
3.463	3.1383	3.5472	3.3177	3.5302	3.5419	3.5785
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>3.4471</u>	<u>3.3734</u>	<u>3.5875</u>	<u>3.5075</u>	<u>3.5827</u>	<u>3.479</u>	<u>3.5127</u>

2000	2002	2004	2008	2012	2016	<u>Average Gen.</u>
2.9178	-	3.405	3.638	4.671	-	<u>3.4551</u>
3.6516	3.7796	3.7474	3.8618	4.0747	4.1018	<u>3.5842</u>
3.6836	3.8585	4.0675	3.7582	3.7597	3.9315	<u>3.6836</u>
3.8234	4.1714	3.8149	3.6735	3.8313	3.7376	<u>3.8643</u>
3.7365	3.9175	3.654	3.6151	3.6623	3.6672	<u>3.7088</u>
-	-	-	-	-	3.7325	<u>3.7325</u>
<u>3.5626</u>	<u>3.9318</u>	<u>3.7378</u>	<u>3.7093</u>	<u>3.9998</u>	<u>3.8341</u>	

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME

Appendix D

Statistics Tables For Each Generations' Linear Regression T-Tests and Linear Regression T-Intervals for β_1 (at 95% Confidence Levels)

<u>The Greatest Generation Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	0.699282
PVal	0.491098
df	24.
a	-2.06623
b	0.002789
s	0.334878
SESlope	0.003988
R ²	0.019968
r	0.141308
Resid	{...}
CLower	-0.005442
CUpper	0.01102
ME	0.008231

<u>The Silent Generation Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	6.33097
PVal	0.000001
df	26.
a	-16.4494
b	0.010109
s	0.149231
SESlope	0.001597
R ²	0.606544
r	0.77881
Resid	{...}
CLower	0.006827
CUpper	0.013391
ME	0.003282

<u>The Baby Boomer Generation Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	4.6448
PVal	0.000177
df	19.
a	-19.813
b	0.011812
s	0.161233
SESlope	0.002543
R ²	0.531722
r	0.729192
Resid	{...}
CLower	0.006489
CUpper	0.017134
ME	0.005323

<u>Generation X Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	-0.734032
PVal	0.478284
df	11.
a	10.1807
b	-0.003161
s	0.15117
SESlope	0.004307
R ²	0.046695
r	-0.21609
Resid	{...}
CLower	-0.012641
CUpper	0.006318
ME	0.009479

<u>Generation Y/Millennials Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	-1.23467
PVal	0.284524
df	4.
a	22.4436
b	-0.009335
s	0.104214
SESlope	0.00756
R ²	0.275942
r	-0.525301
Resid	{...}
CLower	-0.030326
CUpper	0.011657
ME	0.020991

<u>Total Average Full Statistics</u>	
Title	Linear Reg t Test
Alternate Hyp	$\beta \text{ \& } \rho \neq 0$
RegEqn	$a+b*x$
t	5.93957
PVal	0.000003
df	26.
a	-13.2131
b	0.00847
s	0.13328
SESlope	0.001426
R ²	0.575707
r	0.758754
Resid	{...}
CLower	0.005539
CUpper	0.011401
ME	0.002931

GENERATIONS' POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION SHIFTS OVER TIME